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Resumo: 
O artigo analisa o conceito de ceticismo como uma categoria historiográfica para a 
filosofia medieval, abordando as epistemologias de Henrique de Gand e J. Duns Scotus. 
A primeira parte examina distinções metodológicas relativas a metodologia 
reconstrutiva na história da filosofia enquanto aplicadas ao problema do ceticismo. A 
segunda parte apresente os principais problemas da aplicação desta categoria para o 
entendimento do criticismo Scotista da epistemologia de Henrique de Gand. 
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Abstract: 
The essay analyses the concept of skepticism as a historiographical category for 
medieval philosophy, drawing on Henry of Ghent’s and Duns Scotus’s epistemology. 
The first part examines methodological distinctions of reconstructive methodologies in 
the history of philosophy as applied to skepticism. The second part presents the main 
issues concerning the application of the category of skepticism in the understanding of 
Scotus’s criticism of Henry of Ghent’s epistemology. 
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The concept of philosophical skepticism as a historiographical category for 
ancient philosophy often refers to a form of life and culture of belief suspension 
regarding disputable matters that typically challenges our standards of personal 
justification. In the historical study of philosophy, the recognition of this concept of 
skepticism dates back only to the critical reception of the relevant Greek texts in the 
renaissance1. 
 But there is also a theoretical form skepticism, most adequately understood as 
an epistemological use of doubt – instead of a practical use –, as we find 
paradigmatically in modern philosophy and maybe, or so I would like to argue, in later 
medieval scholasticism of the 13-14 centuries2. The authors I would like to talk about, 
Henry of Ghent and Duns Scotus, were mostly preoccupied with evidential justification 
– not so much with the personal aspect of the rationality of our beliefs, but rather with 
their cognitive dimension3. The role skeptical arguments play in these contexts may 
easily pass unnoticed by historians of philosophy, but we should consider that in most 
of contemporary epistemology anti-skeptical strategies are not necessarily directed to 
skepticism as a form of life.  
A serious occupation with skeptical arguments in the middle ages, especially in 
the 14th century, was not an important historiographical concern in medieval philosophy 
scholarship during the first half of the 20th century. There was a view according to 
which high scholasticism, led by Ockham, adhered to a form of skeptical theism which 
engendered a decline in medieval intellectual life and philosophical crisis of Aristotelian 
metaphysics and science. A similar view was sometimes held by Etienne Gilson and 
several Neothomists, and its already to be found in the writings of Franz Brentano4. 
To our mind, we know very well that a big ‘narrative of decline’ in 14th century 
philosophy is not only alien to the philosophical self-understanding of scholasticism but 
is highly dismissive of the role 14th thought played in the formation of modern science5. 
 
1 As of the discovery of the doctrines of Pyrrho in the texts of Sextus Empiricus. To be sure, a translation 
of the text was available in the middle ages, but no significant impact of the epistemological doctrine 
itself is to be found. For the early modern reception of Pyrrhonic skepticism, see Popkin (2003). 
2 Descartes is frequently identified in the relevant epistemological literature as the starting point for this 
form of philosophical skepticism, at least since Ayer’s The Problem of Knowledge.  
3 The distinction between evidential and personal justification is from Michael Williams (1999). 
4 For an overview, see D. Perler (2002, p.13ff). 
5 To overviews of 14th thought in the history of science, see the brilliant essays of Anneliese Maier on the 
medieval ‘forerunners of Galilei’ (1949). 
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Currently, most scholars would endorse the view expressed by Katherine Tachau (2000, 
p. 75), when stating that it is a "most stubborn truism of twentieth-century accounts of 
late medieval philosophy is that after Scotus theologians became skeptics in 
epistemology". Several recent books show a tendency to fill a gap on the study of 
skeptical arguments in medieval thought, an approach which also calls for 
methodological studies to replace exegetical common sense of 20th historiography6. 
Before going into a case study of skeptical arguments in the late 13th and 14th 
century, in Henry of Ghent and John Duns Scotus, I would like to draw some 
methodological reflections about what I take to be reductionisms of the anti-skeptical 
stance on the historiography of medieval philosophy. 
 
I 
 
The first and perhaps most trivial problem about this former historiographical 
paradigm on medieval skepticism is that it seems to overestimate, on purely 
historiographical grounds, the presence of Thomas Aquinas in philosophy in the 14th 
century7. But more interestingly, comparing divergent historiographical theses may 
teach us how incompatible interpretations are the result of accepting different principles 
regarding philosophical theories and their explanatory historical account. To what 
extent are interpretation and historical explanation to be distinguished from one 
another? I would like to make some reflections about this distinction as found in a paper 
by Calvin Normore (2003), whose terminology I borrow. 
It is helpful to think of the distinction between a knowledge system and histories 
of past knowledge by an analogy between a situation and different possible descriptions 
of the same situation. Let me give an example from an ahistorical intellectual 
enterprise8. By the 20th century, Elements de Arithmetique became a widely influential 
book in mathematical education; it was coauthored by a group of French 
mathematicians and published under the pseudonym of N. Bourbaki. Would the 
 
6 Among such recent books are Lagerlund (2010), D. Perler (2002). 
7 To mention only the example, in the writings of Duns Scotus, a thinker whose impact on medieval and 
early modern thought of the 15th and 18th centuries was of massive proportions, Thomas Aquinas is a 
relevant interlocutor only in some of the texts produced during the Parisian period, namely, the Reportatio 
Parisiensis, and certainly not in the texts produced in Oxford and (possibly) Cambridge. 
8 The example is extracted also from C. Normore (2003, p.204f). 
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historical knowledge of some social fact such as this one (that N. Bourbaki was not a 
real mathematician) change something about how we consistently think of the truths of 
mathematics? Apparently not, although social facts are clearly truths about 
mathematics. The question if there is a mathematical history of mathematics would first 
ask whether there could be a history of the truths of mathematics - whether there are 
internal elements of mathematical theories which could be plausible reasons for 
completing and thereby partially substituting or correcting former ones. And if a 
mathematical history of mathematics is then plausible and a positive answer to the first 
question is given, then we are committed to saying that these internal reasons were also 
causes of paradigm shifts; they became truths about mathematical knowledge and not 
only of mathematics. In this sense, there would be an important difference between what 
a purely doxological account of past knowledge and a historical account are committed 
to, but they can cooperate. 
The same seems to hold good for histories of philosophy. We can remark that 
historical approaches to truths about philosophy are quite recent, while reconstructions 
of the truths of philosophy have always been practiced. Philosophers clearly have 
always had an interest in the knowledge of the past. What are compilations, collations 
and commentaries if not a kind of study of the past of philosophy? But while 
commentators are after local rational reconstruction or doxology, a historian is seeking 
the best causal explanation for intellectual change, and even, sometimes, affirming that 
at least some truths about philosophy may be philosophically relevant.  
To this someone could object that philosophically relevant facts of past are 
confined within doxology or in texts, more precisely, in the theories and arguments 
inside them. I think there is at least one hermeneutical reason (about the theory of 
understanding, itself a branch of the theory of knowledge) to reject this objection, 
namely, that historical artifacts often cannot be reliably understood under the concepts 
of a traditional metaparadigm, for the study of past knowledge became considerably 
more difficult over time, and doxological reconstructions of its truths may lead to 
incompatible results which are not decidable based purely on the convictions of a given 
philosophical tradition, which makes philosophical past theories and arguments even 
more difficult to evaluate. This sometimes suggests that textual evidence is not evidence 
enough for understanding what a philosopher of the past really asserted.  
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Doxology, then, is quite different in that it doesn’t seek causal nexus but rational 
reconstruction, and a dialogue with the dead is a good metaphor for its pursuit, for a 
plausible doxology always concerns the truths of philosophy and would resemble the 
way agreements and disagreements are construed in a simulated conversational context. 
This would also hold good for the truths of skeptical arguments, that is, their epistemic 
principles.  In the case of the doxology of skeptical arguments, the epistemic principles 
that partners in a philosophical dialogue could agree upon can make the difference in 
textual interpretation, since the identification of skeptical threats depends at least on an 
understanding of the epistemic standards accepted. This charitable understanding 
doesn’t entail their acceptance – besides its being valid or sound within metaphysical 
assumptions, a principle may not be useful within a given epistemic context.  
An example of what I have in mind is brilliantly depicted in the first of 
Berkeley’s Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous. As in any philosophical 
dialogue, the characters hold opposite positions: Hylas believes what we perceive 
through the senses is the material world, while Philonous does not believe that we have 
(direct) perceptual knowledge of the material world. But it is not the case simply that 
Hylas is a dogmatist and Philonous a skeptic regarding perceptual knowledge. They 
only disagree whether this knowledge commits us to a certain consequence, that is, the 
acceptance of the metaphysical type of ‘material things’. The dialogue begins by 
depicting this very misunderstanding and agreement was only obtained when they 
adopted for each other’s disjunct positions on metaphysics a prima face plausibility 
with our knowledge claims, so that they could investigate further which position really 
has skeptical consequences. The first step illustrated by this agreement exemplifies an 
epistemological use of doubt, and it concerns only the nature of evidence. It is not, by 
any means, a pragmatic use of doubt or a form of agnosticism. 
 In this sense, the skeptic certainly accepts the truth of certain principles, 
precisely those ones which have an epistemological consequence we are not willing to 
accept. The methodological problem in the historiography of skeptical arguments seems 
then to reside on the fact that medievalists strongly oriented by a modern defense of 
thomism were apparently diagnosing agnostic positions which in their own standards 
had skeptical consequences, therefore proceeding externally and remaining unreflective 
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about the fact that they were criticizing skeptical consequences using standards of 
knowledge that these thinkers might not even have accepted. 
 
II 
 
If we adopt a similar principle of charity to reconstruct skeptical arguments, then 
they may be identified within philosophical circles who had a dogmatic approach to 
knowledge, as long as we find out how disagreement over epistemic standards was 
motivated by or itself motivated an epistemological use of doubt. I would like to 
illustrate this point by interpreting one of Duns Scotus’ criticisms of Henry of Ghent’s 
epistemology and their assessments about the certainty of perceptual knowledge9.  I 
think they are in fact engaging in a question about whether we can be certain of the 
content of our individual cognitions.  
Henry of Ghent was, to my knowledge, the single first philosopher in later 
scholasticism to make a methodical use of skeptical arguments, a habit he took from his 
knowledge of latin Hellenistic philosophy. Famously, he defends a version of 
Augustinian illuminationism which denies that we can have certainty of natural 
knowledge without the interference of a correcting activity from God’s own mind10. To 
be sure, Henry grants we have a kind of direct access to the world by natural sense 
perception, but only in the level of simple apprehension, and not in propositional 
knowledge. The point Henry seems to make is that intellectual knowledge rests upon 
totally different evidential requirements than sense perception: instead of knowing what 
is true (id quod verum est), intellectual knowledge needs also to cognize the truth itself 
(veritas / veritas rei), by which Henry means an essence.  Now, clearly, to have 
knowledge of something on the basis of its essence or definition amounts to nothing 
else than knowing a self-evident state of affairs, which is precisely the condition Henry 
wants to deny natural sense perception to have. We could only achieve such certainty in 
the case of analytical truths. 
 
9 The selection of the relevant texts was guided by M. Pickavé (2010). 
10 For what follows, the main source is Henry’s Summa quaestionum ordinariarum, a.1 qq.1-2 (ed. 
Wilson, p.10ff.). 
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With Anselm of Canterbury, Henry defines the truth of propositional knowledge 
as an adjudication of conformity between individuals and mental representations or 
’exemplars’; and Henry holds that these are not naturally acquired. He adduces three 
considerations to support this view. The first is the view that the objects of knowledge 
are in perpetual change and therefore unstable, and knowledge could not derive its 
stability from its contents.  The second reason is that he thinks rectification of our 
incorrect knowledge in the disorderly mind is not possible without the recognition of an 
external criterion which is not present in its natural disorderly state.  
The third consideration, of more interest for our present purposes, is the 
reception of a skeptical principle, the idea that we cannot distinguish phenomenally 
identical items11. As Henry states it, we are not naturally able to distinguish the ‘verum’ 
from the ‘verossimile’. This principle is operative in classical skeptical scenarios such 
as the dream argument, according to which we could not know on the basis of sense 
perception alone whether we are having veridical or non-veridical perceptions, because 
we would have an indistinguishable content as we have the impression of the horse on 
the top of Martin’s Church, were we awake in Groningen or were we asleep in 
somewhere else in the world. Now, Henry does not apply the principle of 
indistinguishability to affirm that sense perception is not reliable at all. He does think 
that, in the case of contradictory perceptions, one must be veridical while the other is 
not.  So, when I see the golden horse at the Martin’s Tower at Groningen to be 2 inches 
large from afar, I don’t get by visual perception the same information that I would, if I 
were on the top of the church; and one of these perceptions must non-veridical.  But he 
does think that we cannot get to veridical perceptions based on the evidence of our own 
mental acts alone, but only as the result of divine illumination. I am focusing on this 
third consideration. 
 Scotus thinks Henry’s illuminationism has skeptical consequences that led to 
the view of the academics; namely, that his application of the principle of 
indistinguishability undermines the possibility of veridical sense perception. To be sure, 
Henry and Scotus were both trying to conceive of anti-skeptical strategies. But Scotus 
has a remarkable different strategy from Henry’s. In a nutshell, while Henry’s strategy 
 
11 This has been labeled as ‘the principle of indistinguishability’ by José L. Bermudéz (2008). 
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is ‘bottom-up’, from sensory to intellectual cognition, Scotus’ is ‘top-down’ for he is 
modelling our perceptual knowledge on an account of self-evident propositions 
(propositiones per se notae), which is a way of testing some of his original views on 
modal epistemology. Scotus tries to refute what he sees as skeptical consequences from 
Henry’s illuminationism with three or four accounts of the objects of knowledge.  
The first of Scotus’ arguments12 for certainty of natural knowledge, which would 
be conceded by Henry, is that we have evident knowledge of analytical or necessary 
truths, propositions known in virtue of the meaning of their terms. This is so because of 
a conformity of the composition or judgment to its terms on the sheer basis of the 
knowledge of their meaning, such as “the whole is greater than its parts”; and the 
acquisition of the terms composing such propositions is irrelevant on Scotus’ account 
since the senses are only an occasion for their formation, and are not causally operative. 
The second Scotist argument in defense of certain natural knowledge is an account of 
‘knowledge by experience’, which is an Aristotelian theory of inductive knowledge, for 
it models knowledge of propositions that are only true as in most cases (ut in pluribus) 
upon the case of self-evident propositions. It does so by introducing a necessitation rule 
for natural causality – that whatever is observed in the most cases as a resulting of 
unfree causes are their natural and determined effects13.  
Both these arguments refer to a quite undisputed view on modal epistemology in 
ancient and medieval philosophy that self-evidence only applies to necessary truths. But 
in a third and fourth defense of certain natural knowledge, Scotus is originally saying 
that contingent propositions can also be self-evident and primitive in epistemonic 
proofs14.  Presumably he is defending our perceptual knowledge of the external world 
and our awareness of our own acts against what he saw to be skeptical threats stemming 
from Henry’s reception of the principle of indistinguishability. 
 But why is Scotus applying a modal criterion on this context? Scotus has in 
mind is the sort of knowledge he claims to have discovered and which he labels 
 
12 The source for the following discussion is the text following Ord. I dist.3 pt.1 q.4 (ed. Vaticana, vol III 
1954 p.123 n.202): “Quaero an aliqua veritas certa et sincera possit naturaliter cognosci ab intellectu 
viatoris, absque lucis increatae speciali illustratione”. This is the starting point for the interlocution with 
Henry of Ghent. For the detailed treatment of this interlocution within the context of skepticism, see again 
M. Pickavé (2010, p.61ff).  
13 Ord. I d.3, pt. 1, q.4 (ed. Vaticana, pp. 146-147, nn.240-241). 
14 For the conception of epistemonic proof, see L. M. de Rijk (2002, pp. 593ff). 
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intuitive cognition (cognition visiva or epistemic vision), an existential awareness of an 
immediately present and contingent state of affairs. Intuitive cognition furnishes the 
mind with evidence for existential judgements of contingent propositions, since it 
involves both the simple apprehension and propositional knowledge simultaneously, 
while Henry has separated them. Scotus contrasted this form of knowledge with 
abstractive cognition, which does not involve an existential judgement, but rather 
abstracts from the indexical hold of the here and now.  
The class of propositions which refer to our own acts belong to the epistemic 
type of cognitive intuitions, for they are clearly contingent propositions.  An intuitive 
cognition would be, for example, when I am presented the proposition through 
perceptual knowledge, that “I am seeing the golden horse on the top of Martin’s 
Church”. They have the form of present tensed first personal sentences, and their 
contents apparently are not restricted to information gained by sense perception or be 
intellectual perception. By affirming that they are self-evident, Scotus means that the 
senses would be only an occasion for their truth, but are not causally sufficient without 
intellectual knowledge. He traces his account of evidence of our own mental acts back 
to Augustine’s cogito argument, according to which we have an unshakable certainty 
about the occurrence of our own mental acts such as “I see”, “I doubt”, or “I am 
awake”. As intuitive cognitions, Scotus seemed committed to say that they are factive 
states as to imply the truth of their contents, and therefore they are regarded as certain 
cognitions. To be sure, on Scotus’ account, it is not clear whether what we are 
immediately aware of are the objects of the external world or our own mental acts; 
Scotus may have assimilated these points in a sort of inchoate mental language. 
This account of the certainty of intuitive cognitions clearly motivates a rejection 
of the principle of indistinguishability of identical phenomenal items, which figured in 
ancient skeptical strategies and in Henry of Ghent’s illuminationism. Scotus thinks this 
to be an implausible epistemic consideration of mental operations, for he thinks intuitive 
knowledge is a factive state which is discriminable for us as we reflect about our own 
mental acts. 
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III 
 
The story hereby presented suggests that Henry adhered to a form of 
illuminationism which Scotus rejected while advancing his views on modal 
epistemology; I think it may be very plausible to say Scotus’ objections to Henry’s 
epistemology discusses a principle of indistinguishability, which is clearly a skeptical 
principle, and that he thereby evaluates and seeks to reject skeptical arguments, even 
though on the putative basis of skeptical consequences. And for its epistemological 
function, medieval skepticism would be a plausible historiographical category. 
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